Investment-related harm does not begin as a legal dispute.

It begins with the loss of land, water contamination, displacement, altered livelihoods, and broken trust. These harms are lived, cumulative, and social. They unfold over time and are experienced collectively. Only later, often much later, are they translated into the language of law. That translation is not neutral.

When harm becomes a “dispute,” it is narrowed, reframed, and relocated. What was once a social conflict becomes a legal contest. What was once experienced locally is adjudicated elsewhere. What was once voiced by communities is now articulated by states and investors in forums far removed from those most affected.

Understanding this transformation is essential to understanding why investment conflict resolution so often excludes the very people at its centre.

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From lived harm to legal abstraction

The legal architecture governing investment disputes is designed to address a specific kind of conflict: disagreements between investors and states over commitments made under treaties or contracts. Its focus is narrow by design. It asks whether obligations were breached, whether expectations were frustrated, whether compensation is owed.

But investment-related harm does not fit neatly into this frame.

Community grievances are rarely about a single legal breach. They concern cumulative environmental degradation, social dislocation, procedural exclusion, and long-term uncertainty. These harms resist quantification and do not map easily onto the binary logic of liability and remedy.

As a result, when disputes arise, much of what matters most is filtered out before the legal process even begins.

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The relocation of conflict

One of the defining features of investment dispute resolution is externalisation. Conflicts that arise in specific social and ecological contexts are relocated to international or transnational forums, most notably arbitration tribunals under mechanisms such as the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), which operate according to their own procedural logic, evidentiary standards, and jurisdictional limits.

This relocation has consequences.

First, it alters who can speak. Communities do not have standing. Their voices appear, if at all, indirectly, through state pleadings, expert reports, or amicus curiae submissions whose admissibility is discretionary.

Second, it alters what counts as harm. Loss is recognised primarily when it can be measured in terms of investor damage. Social and environmental harm is often relevant insofar as it explains state conduct, rather than in its own right.

Third, it alters the meaning of resolution. Remedies are backwards-looking and compensatory. They stabilise legal expectations rather than address ongoing social conflict.

The forum shapes the outcome before any argument is heard.

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Neutrality and its limits

Investment arbitration is frequently defended on the basis of neutrality. Arbitrators are independent. Procedures are legalistic. Politics is excluded.

Yet neutrality is never merely procedural. It is also structural.

A forum is not neutral if its jurisdictional boundaries systematically exclude certain interests. A process is not neutral if it privileges some forms of harm over others. A system is not neutral if it consistently translates social conflict into economic loss.

From this perspective, exclusion is not a flaw of investment dispute resolution. It is a consequence of what the system is designed to do, and what it is designed to ignore.

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Why communities remain outside

Communities are excluded from investment dispute resolution not because they are irrelevant, but because their claims do not fit the legal form.

They do not hold treaty rights.
They are not parties to investment contracts.
Their harms are not the primary object of protection.

Including communities would require more than procedural adjustment. It would require rethinking whose interests investment law exists to serve and what kinds of conflict it is meant to resolve.

That rethinking has not occurred.

Instead, community harm is absorbed indirectly, translated into regulatory justifications, contextual background, or mitigation narratives. The substance of community claims is acknowledged without being justiciable.

The effect is not silence, but managed invisibility.

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From exclusion to instability

There is an irony at the heart of this system.

Investment dispute resolution is often justified as a mechanism for stability and predictability. Yet by excluding communities and narrowing the scope of conflict, it leaves the underlying sources of instability untouched.

Disputes may be resolved.
Awards may be rendered.
Obligations may be clarified.

But grievances persist.

When communities see decisions about their land, environment, and futures resolved in forums they cannot access, law itself begins to lose legitimacy. Conflict does not disappear; it shifts. It re-emerges in protests, domestic litigation, political mobilisation, and social resistance.

The system resolves disputes, but not conflicts.

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The problem, then, is not simply that investment dispute resolution excludes communities. It is that exclusion is treated as normal.indeed, as necessary.

This leads to a question that investment law rarely confronts directly:

Until that question is taken seriously, investment conflict resolution will continue to operate as a site of legal closure rather than social resolution; precise in its reasoning, limited in its vision, and disconnected from the realities that give rise to conflict in the first place.

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Where this leaves us

Investment dispute resolution is often described as a mechanism for stability. It clarifies obligations, renders awards, and settles claims. In that sense, it succeeds on its own terms.

But stability is not the same as justice, and legal closure is not the same as social resolution. When harm is translated into a dispute, much of what gave rise to conflict is left outside the frame.

The system resolves breaches. It does not resolve exclusion.

If dispute settlement remains structurally indifferent to the communities whose lives anchor these conflicts, then reform cannot be confined to procedural adjustment. It must confront a deeper question:

That is not a technical challenge.
It is a political one.

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